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It has taken 140 years, but the Victorian era philosopher Henry Sidgwick’s The 
Methods of Ethics, first published in 1874, has finally received a full-scale and tru-
ly formidable defense of its central claims about the rational basis of ethical 
judgment, a hedonistic account of the good, and act utilitarianism--Katarzyna de 
Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and 
Contemporary Ethics(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).  To be sure, many 
brilliant philosophers, including those who contributed essays to this symposium, 
have celebrated the Methods as a masterpiece of philosophical ethics.  And de 
Lazari-Radek and Singer certainly recognize this and give credit where credit is 
due: 
In this book, we have followed the main lines of Sidgwick’s thinking about ethics, 
and tested his views both against our own reasoning and against the best of the vast 
body of recent and current philosophical writing on the topics he addresses.  The 
overarching question we have sought to answer is whether Sidgwick’s form of utili-
tarianism can be defended.  In most respects we believe it can be.  Parfit’s claim 
that, in the long tradition of ethics, ‘Sidgwick’s book contains the largest number of 
true and important claims’ stands up well. (p. 379). 
But neither Parfit, a great Sidgwickian if ever there was one, nor any of the 
other contributors to this symposium, all of whom are distinguished Sidgwick 
scholars, has ever defended Sidgwick on all three counts—the rational, objective 
basis of ethical judgment, hedonism, and act utilitarianism.  In academic philo-
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sophical circles, it was not so very long ago that any such project would have been 
deemed utterly hopeless, Quixotic in the extreme.1  But now, with the appearance 
of The Point of View of the Universe, it must be deemed cutting-edge.   De Lazari-
Radek and Singer have published what is clearly the most significant statement 
and defense of objective, hedonistic act utilitarianism since the 19th century, and 
they have done so in a work that engages with the most advanced, state-of-the-art 
philosophizing in the world today. 
Indeed, the book is so packed with important, live arguments and issues that a 
symposium of this nature is bound to seem too limited, and one can only hope 
that the longer reception of this work will continue to fill in the picture and shift 
the terms of discussion in moral philosophy.  The contributors to this symposium 
have justifiably concentrated their fire on what are clearly some of the core argu-
ments of The Point of View of the Universe, particularly its distinctive claim to be 
even more Sidgwickian than Sidgwick himself by overcoming the “dualism of 
practical reason” –what Sidgwick took to be the fundamental conflict between 
Rational Egoism and Utilitarian Impartialism, Own Good v. the Good of All—in 
favor of Impartial reasons, the Point of View of the Universe, as Sidgwick’s famous 
phrase put it.  As de Lazari-Radek and Singer explain: 
Although Sidgwick thought that utilitarianism could be grounded on self-
evident axioms, he was troubled by the fact that the axiom of benevolence is 
in conflict with a different principle that seemed to him difficult to deny, 
namely that, for every individual, ‘his own happiness is an end which it is ir-
rational for him to sacrifice to any other’.  This principle, Sidgwick saw, led to 
egoism, and so practical reason seems to endorse both egoism and utilitarian-
ism.  Sidgwick held that this ‘dualism of practical reason’ showed that reason 
cannot, after all, be a complete guide to what we ought to do.  Moreover, if we 
always have sufficient reason to do what is in our own interests—so that acting 
in our own interests would always be rational, but not rationally required—
then that seems to sharply diminish the importance of an ethical theory like 
utilitarianism, based as it is on the idea of acting with impartial concern for 
others.  Sidgwick’s inability to overcome the dualism meant that he was una-
 
1 Even by me, as the introduction to my Essays on Henry Sidgwick (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1992) might suggest.  Fortunately, by the time I published Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the 
Universe (New York: 2004), the horizons for reconstructing Sidgwick’s positions had already wid-
ened considerably.  And as the many readers of Peter Singer will recognize, this book represents 
the most thorough restatement and revision of his views.  Gone are his longstanding commitments 
to R. M. Hare’s prescriptivism and to a preference or desire satisfaction account of the good. 
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ble to conclude that utilitarianism is the only rationally defensible way of de-
ciding what we ought to do.  Egoism survives as an unattractive, but still pos-
sible, alternative…. If we can overcome the dualism of practical reason we are 
left with the axiom of universal benevolence that tells us to maximize the 
good, impartially.  The final step Sidgwick would then need to take would be 
to argue that this good is happiness, for then he would have reached his goal 
of finding a rational procedure that can tell us what we ought to do. (pp. xi-
xii). 
Those, of course, are the very steps taken by de Lazari-Radek and Singer, who 
marshal some of the latest work in evolutionary theory to try to show that Ration-
al Egoism can be “debunked” as an artifact of human evolution, while the axiom 
of benevolence defies such debunking, and that classical hedonism, which has 
been pronounced dead even more often than utilitarianism itself, has risen from 
the grave with the help of, among others, some Nobel Prize winning economists 
and psychologists, not to mention recent neuroscience.   Preferences are out, and 
pleasures are in.  The Neo-Kantianism that John Rawls loosed upon the world 
was, it transpires, right to take utilitarianism as its leading opponent, but very, 
very wrong in thinking that Sidgwick was a mere ghost of the past. 
Some may think that this is just the latest turn of a (very) naive unfinished En-
lightenment Project, in the never-ending struggle among the champions of the 
modern, the premodern, and the postmodern.  But they should look again.  This 
form of classical utilitarianism is no tool of the Panoptical, Surveillance State, or 
of “Enlightenment Blackmail,” or of neo-Imperialism or neo-Liberalism, or of 
consumerism and the ideology of growth, etc. etc.  Indeed, even in Sidgwick’s 
work, there were complex weavings of the premodern, modern, and postmodern—
vast debts to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, along with what can only be called 
Nietzschean forebodings about the shape of things to come.  Both Sidgwick and 
Singer have done their time with Hegel and Marx.  The Point of View of the Uni-
verse does not come to its positions as a result of any failure to appreciate or 
acknowledge the critics—to the contrary, de Lazari-Radek and Singer are advanc-
ing a form of philosophy that can more fully and critically address the global chal-
lenges of today, from climate change and loss of biodiversity to population policy, 
poverty, and bioethics.  In defending Sidgwick, they are in effect releasing the 
deep, and no doubt surprising, potential of his work to help overcome enormous 
social problems that Sidgwick himself could scarcely have foreseen, but which are 
defeating the best efforts of the leading alternatives.   
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Like Sidgwick, de Lazari-Radek and Singer are careful and cautious in their 
claims, not at all given to overstatement.  They acknowledge that much work re-
mains to be done.  But the fact remains that their book is claiming to have at long 
last possibly overcome one of the greatest of all ethical challenges, in some re-
spects the very challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus put to Socrates in Plato’s 
Republic, and to have done so in a manner uniquely relevant to the life or death 
challenges we face today. 
The great champion of the non-violent civil rights movement, Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., titled his last book Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Com-
munity?   In that work, King was explicit in expanding the range of his concerns 
to larger issues of social justice, to the issues of war and poverty.  As events in the 
U.S. and across the world demonstrate, King’s question and concerns are as im-
portant as ever.  Racial justice remains an aspiration, and community a dream.   
What King did not appreciate or anticipate was the degree to which a secular phi-
losophy such as Sidgwickian utilitarianism could support such movements as that 
for effective altruism, which he would have celebrated, or for animal liberation, 
which his leading influence, Gandhi, would have celebrated.   That foundational 
work in academic moral philosophy could produce such social movements, and a 
consciousness of and concern with “the life you can save,” would have delighted 
King, and perhaps made him reconsider the potential of a secular philosophical 
ethics in advancing the “beloved community.”  In any event, it should certainly 
make people today reconsider the meaning and message of the Sidgwickian utili-
tarianism defended in The Point of View of the Universe. 
What should, however, be admitted in this connection is that King might well 
have appreciated Sidgwick’s deep, tormented struggles with religious belief, the 
way in which his agnosticism was reluctant and represented a genuine feeling of 
loss, in a way that de Lazari-Radek and Singer are reluctant to recognize, at least 
beyond a certain point.  In this respect, the Methods, in connection with the 
broader concerns of Sidgwick’s life and work, may harbor yet more riches to 
reap.2 It can speak to an Anthony Kenny, whose work on one of Sidgwick’s favor-
 
2 For a more developed statement of this point, see my “A More Reasonable Ghost: Further Re-
flections on Henry Sidgwick and the Irrationality of the Universe,” available at 
https://roundedglobe.com/html/34a3e7ff-778f-48d5-bca0-ed4e10132715/en/A%20More%20 
Reasonable%20Ghost:%20Further%20Reflections%20on%20Henry%20Sidgwick%20and%20the%20 
Irrationality%20of%20the%20Universe/  Also my The Happiness Philosophers: Lives of the Eminent 
Utilitarians (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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ite poets Arthur Hugh Clough reveals a deeply Sidgwickian sensibility concerning 
religion,3 as well as the stauncher skeptics. 
Thus, admittedly, the contributions to this symposium do not exhaust the pos-
sibilities for engaging with either Sidgwick or de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s The 
Point of View of the Universe.  But they clearly do zero in on topics of undeniable 
importance to anyone interested in either.  Can Sidgwick’s dualism of practical 
reason be overcome in the way de Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest, with an evo-
lutionary “debunking” argument?  Is act utilitarianism really the best position to 
construct out of his axioms, or what his axioms entail?  What about such alterna-
tives as a more constrained, non-maximizing form of impartialism, perhaps one 
that does not extend to all sentient beings?  Or the type of pluralism grounded on 
prima facie duties championed by W. D. Ross, or the rule consequentialism that 
has attracted so much attention of late?  Should Sidgwick’s position be interpret-
ed in terms of what we have most reason to do, period, or as a conflict between 
moral and non-moral reasons?   The essays below, by some of the leading lights of 
Sidgwick studies, present these problems in compelling form, and the replies by 
de Lazari-Radek and Singer tackle the problems posed with the discernment and 
judiciousness of Sidgwick himself.4 
 
3 See Kenny, Arthur Hugh Clough: A Poet’s Life (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007). 
4 My deepest thanks to all of the contributors, for their fine work and patience as this project un-
folded.  And a special thank you goes to Pier Marrone and the other editors of Ethics & Politics, 
who appreciated the importance of this symposium and facilitated its appearance. 
